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In recent years religious issues and rhetoric have again become promi- 
nent in American politics. Jimmy Carter campaigned for the presidency 
in 1976 as a born-again Christian. Ronald Reagan has twice been 
elected with both rhe verbal and the financial support of various reli- 
gious groups, often of fundamentalist persuasion. To the surprise of 
liberal Americans and foreign observers alike, well established issues of 
economic planning, urban renewal, abject poverty, etc., were largely 
ignored during the campaign of 1984 in favor of issues with deep reli- 
gious resonance, such as the issues of abortion, school prayer, and crea- 
tionism. While biblical references pervaded political debate, there was at 
the same time a marked increase in international tensions and a drama- 
tical intensification of the arms race. The notion of "godless Commu- 
nism" returned to American politics. "Armageddon" appeared as a 
point of contention in the presidential debate over foreign policy be- 
tween Walter Mondale and Ronald Reagan in October 1984. 
In this light it appears reasonable to ask whether there is so+ kind 
of relationship between the new readiness to contemplate the means of 
unprecedented violence and the increase of religious oratory. The ques- 
tion is: do religious sentiments and concerns somehow serve to adjust 
societies to new and intensified levels of potential violence? If so what 
are the cultural and religious preconditions which can be sed to 
prepare Americans to invest their tax-money to develop w aponry 
heavens? 
f 
capable of inflicting unparalleled destruction upon the earth and the 
One objection to this kind of inquiry may be cleared away at the out- 
set. This is the charge that the question is distorted, because outside 
threats, such as the existence of Communist missiles or international 
terrorism, fully explain the recent American emphasis upon prepared- 
ness. This objection fails in several respects. First, it cannot explain why 
different societies respond to the same threats in different ways. While 
Russian missiles presumably threaten the whole Western world, there 
are obvious differences between European and American responses to 
the perceived threat. Secondly, it cannot explain why prominent 
American politicians use religious references and metaphors to a much 
greater degree that do those European governments which share the 
official American attitude that the public should be persuaded to accept 
the necessity for new generations of attack and defense missiles. 
It may seem, finally, that the objection itself is dependent upon 
certain prejudices that are nourished, for the most part in secret, in a 
Lutheran culture. Luther, in marked contrast to Calvin, did his utmost 
to build a Chinese Wall of doctrine that would serve to separate religion 
from the exercise of secular political power.1 His primary intention was 
undoubtedly to protect religious communities from being contaminated 
by secular violence. But he fully accepted the logical corollary which was 
to release secular power from traditional religious restraints. Thus, he 
allowed no appeal for mercy in exhorting the German princes to slay the 
rebels during the Peasants' War. Since Luther, European protestantism 
has generally found it easy to regard the secular order as an autonomous 
sphere, where government can marshal its means of violence with only 
a minimal recourse to moral homilies. 
As evidenced by numerous religious wars, Lutherans emphatically 
rejected turning the other cheek when assaulted. But they also rejected, 
at least as a matter of theological doctrine, the defense of their Lord with 
the sword, as Peter, the disciple, had suggested. Instead, Lutherans 
maintained with Paul that unto God should be rendered what properly 
belonged to his realm of grace, while violence and its repression by 
violence belonged to the realm of Caesar. Regardless of whether they 
consider themselves members of a church or not, most people in 
Lutheran cultures find attempts to combine religious and political 
reasoning obscene or even blasphemous. Thus, Danish newsmen and 
commentators, who are hardly known as a group for their deep religious 
commitments, often observe and present American political rhetoric 
with a noticeable distaste for its religious overtones that reflect a Calvi- 
nist or Puritan ethic. 
While the Puritans in England had been strongly critical of the alliance 
between the Church of England and the state, they developed a different 
view once they had the opportunity to create a state of their own in 
America. The first Puritan company 'on Boarcie the Arrabella, on the 
Attlantick Ocean' declared their hope for a new Jerusalem where eccle- 
siastical and secular orders would be separate, while preserving their 
capacity to act in consonance. They wanted, in John Winthrop's famous 
words, to build "a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people upon us." The 
Puritans saw themselves as the salt of the earth, as an elect minority, 
whose function was to penetrate the life of the commonwealth, but at the 
same time remain distinct as a holy body of saints in order to preserve 
their status as an inspiring model. 
Citizenship in early Massachusetts was dependent upon church 
membership, which in turn was limited to a minority of individuals able 
to verify their deep religious experience. As Ernest Barker has put it: "To 
the early Puritans of Massachusetts the State was an organ not of the 
mere justice of law, but of the abounding righteousness of grace and 
election."z In England and Scotland, Puritans for the most part 
advocated limits to governmental control over the moral and religious 
life of the citizens. Puritans in the New World, in contrast, demanded 
that government be carried out according to principles that prepared the 
citizen for higher religious ends. A typical example was the demand that 
secular authorities punish the display of luxuries. In Europe, the ruling 
classes had always assumed that conspicuous consumption among the 
wealthy served to humble the lower classes. In Boston, lavish display of 
wordly goods was thought to undermine the cohesion of society, not only 
because luxuries encouraged the sin of pride, but also because they were 
an insult to the civic spirit of the colony. 
The culture of righteousness and austerity was undermined in the 
course of a few decades. The very success of the colony, its commercial 
expansion, and its attraction for immigrants who looked for economic 
opportunities rather than for spiritual salvation, contributed to this 
development. In  addition, Puritan leaders worried about the coming of 
age of a new generation which had not experienced the trials of persecu- 
tion, suppression, and hardship that had informed the politics of the 
early settlers. In order to preserve as much as possible of the original 
spirit of the colony, Puritan divines attempted to institutionalize the 
sense of crisis which had kept spiritual leadership in command, strCng- 
thened communal bonds, and made people willing to sacrifice their self- 
interest on demand. The primary means of the routinization of crisis 
was a ritual of communal castigation, consisting of days of repentance, 
fast, and prayers and augmented with what later scholars have termed 
"the Jeremiad." When the congregation was well prepared, Puritan 
preachers heaped upon the believers the solemn warnings of the Old 
Testament, reciting long lists of afflictions measured out by an angry 
God: premature death, Indian assualt, disease, crop failure. The 
congregation was reminded of the terms of its covenant with the Al- 
mighty and awed by the fate of Israel: 
5 5 
If we should so frustrate and deceive the Lords Expectations, that his Covenant- 
interest in us, and the Workings of Salvation be made to cease, then All were lost 
indeed; Ruine upon Ruine, Destruction upon Destruction would come, until one 
stone were not left upon another.3 
The modern form of American religion with its periodic waves of 
intense, evangelical revivalism did not emerge until the 1740s with the 
outbreak of the "Great Awakening." By this time, Puritanism had faded 
away and along with it the political commitments of religion. The Great 
Awakening was not addressed to a political elite responsible for the 
moral standard of society, "the Clergy," 'the Noble," or "the Wise." It 
was directed towards "what we call the Mob, the Rabble, the common and 
meaner Sort," explained Samuel Finley, one of the foremost revivalist 
preachers, who compared his audience to the ragged crowd that followed 
Jesus.* 
The great revival turned almost all the Puri_tan premises for religious 
activity upside-down. Puritans had held biblical knowledge in high 
regard. Thefhad taught their members to hold their own in dogmatic 
disputes, and they took pride in their intolerance towards heretical ideas. 
The revival, in contrast, was for everybody, not only for Puritans, but for 
Church of England-men, Presbyterians, Baptists, and for every other 
Christian denomination. While the Puritan system of church govern- 
ment presupposed lasting ties between the pastor and the congregation, 
revivalism was effected by itinerant preachers who travelled up and 
down the coast in search of sinners. As Benjamin Franklin shrewdly 
remarked, this was the secret behind the perfection of revivalist prea- 
ching. The sermons were "so improv'd by frequent Repetitions, that 
every Accent, every Emphasis, every Modulation of Voice" were timed 
And tuned to create a result that compared with "an excellent Piece of 
Musick." Stationary preachers had no similar opportunity to "Improve 
their delivery of a Sermon by so many Rehearsals."s 
Puritans were notoriously restrained in manners, intellectual in out- 
look, methodical and disciplined in conduct. They were deeply suspi- 
cious about outward affectations. Revivalists were proud of their ability 
to collect great sums of money. But the most important justification of 
revivalism came from its demonstrated capacity to set the masses in 
motion. Itinerant preachers saw the finger bf ~ b d  at work when huge 
audiences went into religious ecstacy. Jonathan Edwards, the greatest of 
the Awakeners and probably America's foremost theologian, praised the 
"holy affection" which came about when sinners began "to look pale," 
when they "shed tears," when they began "to tremble," "faint," "cry 
out," and were "put into conculsions.~'6 
Thus, despite changes in format and setting, revivalism was the 
inheritor of the Puritan Jeremiad. The artful rhetoric of lamentation, 
renunciation, and exhortation, carefully cultivated by Puritan divines, 
was turned into an emotional climax by the revivalist. To enter the 
community of the saved, the sinner was required to engage himself in a 
state of mental purification designed to destroy any political aspirations 
or ideas of communal action. All political values and bonds were dis- 
solved, and the common ground was verbally removed from under his 
feet. The sinner was left dangling in a nowhere-land with all his or her 
attention focussed upon the wrath and mercy of divine power: 
The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some loath- 
some insect over the fire, abhors you and is dreadfully provoked: his wrath towards 
you burns like fire, ... he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight ... It is 
nothing but his hand that holds you from falling into the fire every moment.7 
This was Puritanism fit for the poor, the humble, and the powerless. It 
was also, as one political theorist has remarked, "an object lesson in how 
ordinary people contribute to their own victimization - not because they 
believe in God but because they have come to distrust themselves,"8 
The political content of Puritanism was subverted in the process of 
revivalism. Edwards made no secret of the fact that the Great Awake- 
ning depended upon the ability to put other concerns to sleep. Primarily, 
it involved systematically forgetting the wordly structures of power and 
powerlessness. Significantly, Edwards paused to report that religious 
excitement did not mean that laborers ceased to work, nor did people 
"ordinarily neglect their wordly business." But, as Edwards' abundant 
writings testify, politics simply disappeared from sight, when "this work 
of God" was unleashed upon the sinners: "Religion was with all sorts the 
great concern, and the world was a thing only by the by. The only thing 
in their [the people's] view was to get the kingdom of heaven, and every 
one appeared pressing into it."9 
The Great Awakening established a pattern of periodic popular revivals 
that have continued to overrule denominalism and religious pluralism 
down to the present day. It has been called America's "national conver- 
sion" by a prominent historian of religion.10 The Civil War and its 
aftermath, by contrast, may be called America's "conversion to natio- 
nalism." The most important fact about American nationalism is that it 
flowed from a civil war, not from a war between nations. In national 
wars, the rulers tend to excite hatred and contempt for the population of 
the opposing nation. Rulers mobilize religion to protect the national 
army, to make its weapons irresistible, and to destroy the power of the 
enemy. The United States had fought wars of extermination against 
both thc~ndians and the Mexicans. The Civil War, however, was a war 
against neighbors, brothers, and friends who would "read the same 
Bible7' and "pray to the same God" and with whom the North shared 
a confession to liberty and popular government.ll It was thus a war 
which permitted the application of violence to be presented as an 
attempt to save the soul of the South from her sin of apostacy. Victory 
was not enough. The wounds of the Union required an apocalypsis that 
would clear its spirit for a "new birth of freedom."'2 The Unionists 
prayed for nothing less than the Second Coming of Christ, most memor- 
ably in the song that was soon to be adopted as "The Battle Hymn of the 
Republic."l3 
In the contemporary speeches of Abraham Lincoln, the Jeremiad was 
reformulated to provide a rationale for the wars which put the idea of the 
nation above the contestants on the battlefield. The endless bloodshed 
became a visitation by God, a supreme ritual of catharsis, the sign of 
divine wrath which purified the land and prepared the rebirth of the 
Nation: 
The Almighty has His own purposes. 'Woe unto the world because of offenses .... ' He 
gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom 
offense came. ... Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge 
may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continues until the wealth piled by the 
bondsman's two-hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until 
every drop drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was 
said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgements of the Lord 
are true and righteous altogether.' 
With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God 
gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the 
nation's wounds. I* 
Violence, even applied with unprecedented intensity, could be carried 
out righteously if it was inspired and guided by the spirit of charity and 
compassion.15 These motives were authenticated by an arcane compact 
which tied both parties of the war together in a political union and 
assumed the features of a sacrament. In Lincoln's view, this holy 
compact was the Declaration of Independence and its institution of 
"government of the people, by the people, for the people."l6 Lincoln's 
stunning transvaluation of values established that violence and compas- 
sion were not opposites but closely interconnected in the process of 
purifying the fountain and the mysterious origins of the compact which 
tied the contestants together on the deepest plane of reality. Violence 
became charity by other means, as it were. 
Most modern commentators have focussed their attention upon 
Lincoln's refusal to set himself up as an interpreter of God's will. Lincoln 
has been praised for his "scepticism" which was "elevated by piety and 
humility."l7 It has often been overlooked that Lincoln's reasoning is also 
distinguished by its overruling of such ancient virtues as clemency and 
mercy. When shared love dictates compulsion, mercy cannot be allowed 
to interfere and upset decisions of the battlefield or in the councils of 
state. While Lincoln's justification for the war is distinguished by his 
reluctance to sanctify the violence of the one side in the process of con- 
demning the power of the other, his argument left no room for com- 
promise until the utter prostration of the enemy was accomplished. 
Lincoln's conception of war, which allowed him to bypass in silence 
the liberal idea of consent as the basis of the Constitution, came to 
bedevil American foreign policy in the twentieth century. Lincoln's role 
in the defeat of the slave regimes, his heroic fate, and the incomparable 
beauty of his public addresses with their deep resonance in Puritan 
culture came to predispose Americans to see all wars in the image of civil 
war, where power is brought to bear on people for their own sake. It was 
easy to forget that Lincoln's argument presupposed a political commu- 
nion, sealed by a holy compact. It could only justify violence within 
political borders, not across them, because borders signified the geo- 
graphical limits of the compact. Lincoln himself had been a persistent 
opponent of the Mexican war in 1848. But soon enough, friendship, 
brotherhood, and neighborliness were declared on a global basis. The 
view that war can serve the course of righteousness when moved by a 
spirit of charity was tirelessly repeated during the War of 1898 in order 
to save Cubans and Philippinos from the Spanish and from themselves. 
The argument without its original presuppositions was repeated again 
during World War I, although it was now phrased as the idea of 
"making the world safe for democracy." 
But while religious appeals were able to sustain the nation during and 
after the Civil War, they laid the ground for later conflicts. Liberalprote- 
stantism, as exemplified in the Progressive age by such Presidents as 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, embarked on a course 
which turned "the Citty upon the Hill" into a modern world power 
dependent upon industrial and military resources, not upon old- 
fashioned morality18 Modernity proved to be the most formidable 
enemy of religious truths, rural pieties, and moral homilies. A rapid 
pace of invention, a convulsive pattern of social change, the continued 
growth of an urban, secular culture, and an increasing commitment to 
science and technology turned out to be some of the requirements that 
a modernizing liberal society exacted incessantly from its population. 
Given the choice between accommodating religion to wordly circum- 
stances or insisting that social and economic development conform to 
basic religious modes of thought, progressives had no serious doubts.19 
As pointed out by historian Richard Hofstadter, conservative religion 
was not only discredited with the fight over evolution during the so- 
called Scopes trial in 1925. It was wounded and humiliated.20 But it did 
not pass away. Conservative or fundamentalist beliefs were in fact 
reproduced continuously, as modernization proved to be a continuing 
process which accelerated after World War 11. As society moved 
forward, large groups of the population were left behind with outmoded 
skills and with forms of knowledge that ill equipped them to participate 
in a modern technological culture. For such groups, the result is best 
described not as their "loss of status," but as their heightened sense of 
- 
vulnerability and as a fact of powerlessness. 
The sequel to the Scopes trial was the election of President John F. 
Kennedy. Kennedy was not only the first Catholic to be elected Presi- 
dent. He presented himself as the spokesman for the cutting edge of 
young, urban, professional, cosmopolitan America. His inauguration 
address is usually read for its tasteful invoc?tion of "His blessing and His 
help," and for its "belief that the rights of man come not from the 
generosity of the state but from the hand of God."21 It has therefore 
been less noticed that the same words which recommended the indivi- 
dual to God's hands, allocated omnipotence to the state: "Man holds in 
his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and 
to abolish all forms of human life." 
Twenty years later President Reagan was elected on the basis of promises 
that recaptitulated Kennedy's commitment to leadership, to tax reduc- 
tion, to fill a missile gap (updated as the "window of vulnerability"), to 
technological advance, to a vigorous economy, and to military rejuvena- 
tion. Reagan inherited a liberal legacy which had grown old and 
experienced, hardened by defeat in Vietnam and by constitutional crises 
surrounding the presidency itself. The popular constituency was now 
marked by its experiences of stagflation, its fear of shrinking resources 
and exacerbated problems of pollution. After Vietnam, there were fewer 
promises to save "any friend." Instead, the emphasis was put upon a 
"pledge" to keep the world at peace.'' This task, full of Christian 
appeal, was subsequently launched by the Reagan administration as the 
rationale for the development of highly sophisticated weapons. Given 
mankind's proclivity to disturb the peace, it was clear that such weapons 
must be capable not only of striking everywhere on short notice but also 
able to patrol the ski. 
Perhaps a brief consideration of a recent incident will serve to 
measure the distance from Lincoln to Reagan, i.e., the distance between 
a religion fit for the nation and a religion fit for global superpower. 
During the Congressional discussions in early 1985 about the size of the 
defense budget, Reagan entertained a fundamentalist group of sup- 
porters with speculations about a passage of St. Luke (14:31-32). Reagan 
told reporters afterwards that the passage meant that "the Scriptures are 
on our side."23 It was not made clear whether "our side" referred to the 
contest with Russians or to the contest with the opponents in Congress. 
But the implication was obviously that God-fearing Americans were. 
again called upon to invest in weapons of righteous violence, including 
the Star Wars Program (Strategic Defense Initiative). 
The incident is useful because it reveals the nature of the President's 
personal religious beliefs. To recruit the Gospel verbally and to get it to 
join ranks "on our side" is to put divine authority under secular 
command. Reporters correctly assumed that the intention was not to 
declare the beginning of a military crusade, but to solicit support from 
groups who were supposed to have a more inspired relationship to the 
Bible. Thus, Reagan's words highlight the problematic relationship 
between the administration and the fundamentalist minority of true 
believers in God's words. While the administration welcomes the 
support of the fundamentalists, it is also fearful that too close an 
embrace will alienate substantial numbers of moderate conservatives. In 
addition, a political program which depends upon oldfashioned moral 
rearmament can easily endanger the complex system of bureaucratic 
control and industrial production upon which the republic depends for 
its defense. The damage done by Senator Joseph McCarthy's investiga- 
tion of spiritual deficits in the State Department and in the army in the 
beginning of the 1950s is a reminder of the need to shield a complicated 
bureaucratic machinery from anti-communist fanatics, the modern 
luddites of rational defense procedures. 
To preserve the Republican electoral alliance and to prevent a clash 
- between moral and military rearmament, the current administration 
hopes to fend off the fundamentalist persuation with biblical references 
that presupp-ose a certain amount of political illiteracy. In the spring of 
1986, however, Reagan ordered a limited attack against Libya, adding 
action to rhetoric and projecting the image of "the revenger to execute 
wrath upon him that does evi1."24 American officials took care to 
emphasize that avenge in the form of state counter-terrorism could only 
be carried out where the adversary was isolated and politically and mili- 
tarily defenseless. Evidence that pointed to Syrian complicity was 
treated with some moderation, while evidence of Libyan involvement 
with Palestinian terrorists was widely publicized. 
Several commentators have argued that American fundamentalism is 
of limited use in the long haul of defence expenditures. If Samuel P. 
Huntington may be taken as a representative example, conservative 
political scientists have long since determined that American funda- 
mentalism is the expression of a parochial and separatist frame of 
mind.25 Fundamentalists want to clean America of homosexuality, of 
pornography, of Communism in high places, and of welfare recipients. 
They believe that the rest of the World is so mired in these sins that it is 
hardly worth saving. While they want American power to triumph 
everywhere, they also tend to see inevitable compromises of foreign 
policy as the source of conspiracy and corruption in America. Indefinite 
foreign entanglements, as required by a global power, are considered 
not only demoralizing and contaminating but too expensive. To over- 
come these problems, Reagan has developed a remarkable talent for 
moving adroitly in the gap between the organizers of the electronic 
churches and their constituency. While self-appointed fundamentalist 
- - 
spokesmen, such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, can make a nuis- 
ance of themselves when they expose official policy toward South Africa 
by praising P.W. Botha as a saint and the Krugerrand as a coin of right- 
eousness, the ordinary supporter of the Moral Majority seems to remain 
a loyal supporter of President Reagan, whose administration is marked 
by the ability to combine biblical references and deep-seated hatred of 
Communism with a fairly cautious approach to foreign policy. Ronald 
Reagan was only made the candidate of the Moral Majority at a late 
date before his nomination as Republican candidate for the presi- 
dency.26 His surprising skills may be described as a matter of providing 
a form of leadership that the organizers of the fundamentalist minority 
cannot refuse. It is unlikely that a new republican candidate will be able 
to repeat Reagan's success. 
Perhaps a more stable and important source of religious support is being 
put together among conservative Lutherans in the hope of convincing 
the majority of American voters about pressing defense needs. This may 
be inferred from comments made by Richard Neuhaus, director of the 
Center of Religion and Society in New York. In reaction to Reagan's 
reference to St. Luke, Neuhaus rushed to save the President from being 
further embarrassed by his supporters from the backwoods of American 
fundamentalism, Far from suggesting that Reagan should read his Bible 
more carefully in preparation for his fight with the Evil Empire, Richard 
Neuhaus suggested that Reagan abstain from religious references that 
would weaken his case for military superiority. As Neuhaus put it: 'I 
think the president would be well-advised to make the argument for his 
military budget and strategies on the basis of public reasoning rather 
than invoking dubious biblical authority"27 Neuhaus' comment is 
symptomatic of a return to a Lutheran wall between sound "public 
reasoning," i.e., expert calculation of technical opportunities and enemy 
capabilities, on the one hand, and "biblical authority" on the other. 
The central article of faith that unites neo-orthodox, neo-conservative 
theologians is their perception that Lutheranism is better suited to deal 
not with creeping Communism at home but with the threat of Soviet 
dominance and world revolution. There is also a noticeable fear that 
Americans cannot be endlessly persuaded to invest in weaponry of over- 
kill just to match Soviet paranoia. With Luther these theologians reject 
the idea of a tenable division between righteous and unrighteous en& of 
violence. But they seem to agree that Lutheran theology can be claimed 
for a distinction between righteous and unrighteous means of violence, 
which is more likely to stiffen the nerve of the American takpayer. Look 
again at Lincoln's discrimination between means of violence, "the lash" 
and "the sword.'' 
Coercion by the lash is the perfect metaphor for dirty violence; it is 
continuously applied, it is bloody, it is debasing for the subjugated no 
less than for the yielder of power. Coercion by the sword, in contrast, is 
sudden, effective, overwhelming, perhaps even honorable, because it is 
applied on the basis of a formal equality which is established by choice 
of weapons and shared risks. While the lash corrupts the soul of societies 
that depend upon physical violence as the means of order, the sword - 
especially if transfigured into modern weaponry - signifies that violence 
is exerted at a distance, normally by highly trained experts, so as to 
preserve the common tax-payer and society in general from the stench 
of bloodshed. As implied by conservative theologians, the debauchery of 
dirty violence, presumably inherent in the very form of government of 
the enemy, must be measured against the means of purified violence 
which is cultivated by scientific genius in Western civilization. Lincoln's 
metaphors and their reverberation in recent American war experience 
can then be translated by Neuhaus' organization. The premise is: 
In this century of Hitler and Stalin and their lesser imitators the most urgent truth 
to be told about secular politics is the threat of totalitarianism. 
The conclusion is quickly drawn: 
The United Stated of America is the primary bearer of the democratic possibilities 
in the world today. The Soviet Union is the primary bearer of the totalitarian alterna- 
tive.28 
The Reagan administration faces a pressing dilemma. It is convinced 
about the need for extraordinary means of global violence. At the same 
time, however, the administration has to acknowledge the existence of a 
widespread revulsion against the destructive capacity of modern 
weaponry. The modern abomination of desolation is seen to involve 
nothing less than a direct challenge to the ultimate mystery which 
sustained religious imagination in the Judaic-Christian tradition from 
its very origin. After the Flood, a long time before the idea of human 
salvation and eternal life was introduced, the revengeful Jehova decided 
to restrain his impatience: "And the LORD said in his heart, I will not 
again curse the ground any more for man's sake. ... Neither will I again 
smite any more every thing living, as I have done. ... Summer and 
winter, and day and night shall not cease."29 
The same science which produced the technology of modern warfare 
has repeatedly assured the public that neither human nor any other 
higher organic form of life can be expected to survive even a limited 
nuclear contest. The present religious anxiety represents a reaction to 
the suppressed knowledge that primal divine limits to power are being 
discredited as a matter of mundane, budgetary planning. The rise of 
religious rhetoric in recent years reflects, at least in part, an agitated 
search for an inspired mystique that can take the place of the Genesis. 
Such a mystique is needed when a reluctant population is to be impli- 
cated in renewed risks of suffering and perpetrating unprecedented 
violence. One may perhaps get a glimpse of the difficulties that the 
present administration is faced with. While Lincoln asked for public 
sacrifices that would make America safe for majoritarian republi- 
canism, Reagan's policy is best characterized by its costly initiatives to 
make the world safe for nuclear competition. 
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